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F. POGGIOLESI On the Importance of Being
Analytic
The paradigmatic case of the logic of proofs
Abstract
In the recent literature on proof theory, there seems to be a new raising
topic which consists in identifying those properties that characterise a good
sequent calculus. The property that has received by far the most attention
is the analyticity property. In this paper we propose a new argument in
support of the analyticity property. We will do it by means of the example
of the logic of proofs, a logic recently introduced by Artemov [1]. Indeed a
detailed proof analysis of this logic sheds new light on the logic itself and
perfectly exemplify our argument in favour of the analiticity.
1 Introduction
We are currently witnessing the thriving of many different logics. Or, as Avron
more drastically puts it, “there is no limit on the number of logics that logicians
(and non-logicians) can produce” [3, pp. 1-2]. Faced to this situation, one ques-
tion seems to naturally arise: What is a good logic? The first answer that we
can think of is: a logic that has applications. This answer, although natural and
simple, cannot be satisfactory: logic is an autonomous discipline and as such
it deserves its own independent criterion. A good internal criterion is then the
existence of a simple and illuminating semantics. This is always a good sign.
But
A more important criterion (in my opinion, and since logics deal
above all with proofs) is the existence of a good proof system. [3, pp.
1-2] [Our emphasis.]
It then seems that we have answered the question. However, one might say
that we are just begging the question, because now the issue is that of defining
what a good proof system is. Otherwise stated, the new question is: what
are the characteristics that a proof system needs to satisfy to be considered as
good? This topic has been the centre of many proof theorists’ attention over
the last ten years (e.g. [9], [13], [18]). Amongst the properties that have been
proposed for defining what a good proof system is, one of the most famous
and well-known is by far the analyticity property. The main aim of this paper
is to focus and study this property. More precisely, our concern is to give a new
argument in favour of the analyticity property. So the question “what is a good
logic” and “what is a good proof system” can be seen as the general framework
in which the analyticity property will be discussed.
1
The paper will be developed as follows. Section 2. We will introduce the
reader to the two notions of analytic proof and subformula property. The latter
notion can be thought of as a formalisation of the former notion in the frame-
work of the sequent calculus. We will explain two modern arguments that have
been given in support of the subformula property and we will then provide a
new argument in support of the subformula property. The rest of the paper
will be dedicated to the exemplification of this new argument. For this we will
use the logic of proofs that will be concisely presented in Section 3, and a recent
result on the logic of proofs [15] that will be explalined in Sections 4-5. In Section
6 we will draw some conclusions.
2 Analytic Proofs
Since we are interested in the analyticity property and, more precisely, in ana-
lytic proofs, let us start by explaining what exactly we mean by these notions.
First of all, we use the term proof here in a broad sense: it denotes a ratio-
nal procedure by means of which one may recognise the truth of a sentence.
Depending on how this procedure is developed, one usually distinguishes be-
tween synthetic proofs and analytic proofs. According to a synthetic concep-
tion, the starting point of a proof are acquired truths, and the proof itself is
developed as a gradual determination of propositions whose truth is ensured
by the previous ones. The proof stops when the proposition whose truth we
aim to establish is finally reached. By contrast, under an analytic conception,
the starting point of a proof is the proposition whose truth we aim to establish,
and the proof itself is developed as a gradual finding of propositions whose
truth can assure the truth of the successive ones. The proof stops when es-
tablished truths, in the sense of first principles or basic ingredients, are finally
reached.
Explained this way the contrast between synthetic and analytic proofs seems
to amount to nothing more than a distinction between different ways in which
the same object can be read: synthetic proofs privilege a top-down direction,
while analytic proofs privilege a bottom-up direction. Such a distinction could
hardly sound revealing from a logical perspective. The question seems then
to be: is there a logical significant way in which we can distinguish synthetic
proofs from analytic proofs? The answer is positive and can be expressed as
follows. While a synthetic conception tends to yield proofs which are con-
cise, in analytic proofs the emphasis is on the reduction from more complex
concepts to simpler ones. Otherwise stated, while synthetic proofs have the
advantage of being short, analytic proofs can be seen as self-contained: every
element which occurs in the proof will also occurs in the conclusion.
Support for the analytic method has a long and venerable history. This his-
tory extends back to ancient Greece, (with both Plato and Aristotle, but also
with the pythagorean Hippocrates of Chius and the third century mathemati-
cian Pappus), passes trough the early modern era (with Descartes, Arnauld
and Pascal), and arrives up to the first half of the nineteenth century with the
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great Bohemian thinker, Bernard Bolzano. A great importance to the notion
of analyticity has also and finally been given by the logician Gerhard Gentzen.
Gentzen seems to follow the long tradition just presented above, in considering
the analyticity property to be of crucial relevance:
Perhaps we may express the essential properties of such a normal
form by saying: it is not roundabout. No concepts enter into the proof
other then those contained in its final result, and their use was there-
fore essential to the achievement of that result. [6, pp. 87-88][Our
emphasis]
As is famously known, in 1935 Gentzen introduced the sequent calculus. The
sequent calculus is a particular proof system widely used in modern proof
theory. The sequent calculus generates what we are going to call derivations,
and which are nothing but a formalisation of the concept of proof introduced
above. So Gentzen had formal and precise notions of proof system and proof;
he used them to obtain a formal and precise notion of analyticity, which is
broadly known as the subformula property. A sequent calculus is said to sat-
isfy the subformula property if, and only if, every provable sequent possesses a
derivation such that every formula which occurs in it is a subformula of the
formulas which occur in the conclusion. Observe that a sequent calculus has
the subformula property if the following two conditions are satisfied
(i) the cut-rule is admissible (or eliminable1), and
(ii) in every other rule all the formulas that occur in the premises are subfor-
mulas of the formulas that occur in the conclusion.
Therefore Gentzen together with a long list of illustrious thinkers, of whom
we have quoted only several, prefer and support the analytic method. More-
over Gentzen introduced the sequent calculus, and, by means of this new logi-
cal object, he succeeded in giving a formal rendering of the notion of analytic-
ity, namely the suformula property. These facts would seem per se sufficient for
drawing the following conclusion: when dealing with Gentzen systems, one
must deal with Gentzen systems that satisfy the subformula property.
Note that other modern arguments have been given in favour of the sub-
formula property. We briefly recall two of them. The first argument is linked to
the philosophical trend called proof-theoretic semantics (e.g. see [10]). Following
this trend we can look at the logical rules of a sequent calculus as definitions
of the constants that they introduce. As was emphasised by Les´niewski [11],
definitions must be conservative and eliminable. So even logical rules must
be conservative and eliminable. The property that ensures the logical rules
of a sequent calculus to be conservative is the subformula property. So the
subformula property is desirable for reasons related to the meaning of logical
constants.
1We take these notions for granted. The unacquainted reader could see [17, pp. 92-94].
3
The second argument in support of the subformula property has to do with
the mathematical advantages that the subformula property yields (e.g. see [7]).
Let us list a few of them. The subformula property (sometimes) allows one
to prove the decidability of the given calculus. Moreover, by working with
cut-free proofs, we can show that intuitionistic logic is prime, and that both
classical and intuitionistic logic have the interpolation property. So, according
to this second point of view, the subformula property is defendable for reasons
related to the mathematical strength of a calculus.
Given these valuable arguments in favour of the analyticity property, and
more precisely of the subformula property, one might be led to think that
nowadays everybody agrees on its importance. Although many logicians and
philosophers do not doubt the crucial relevance of the subformula property,
there also exist those who continue to underestimate its value (e.g. see [4], [8]).
These thinkers do not philosophically argue in favour of non-analytic proof-
systems, but they propose calculi that are so made, this way implicitly belit-
tling the value of the subformula property. Given this situation, it then seems
useful to give a further argument in support of the analyticity property,2 if one
believes in its importance. We propose the following one:
the proof of the analyticity of a sequent calculus allows one to fully
understand the features of the logic that the sequent calculus has
been developed for.
The argument is simple but also contains interesting suggestions. On the
one hand, it is an argument completely based on the conceptual understand-
ing of a given logic, so it seems to get to the heart of the matter. Moreover,
unlike the other arguments, it is completely autonomous: it does not contain
any reference to a philosophical trend, such as that concerning the meaning of
logical constants, nor it depends on the mathematical utility of a theory.
The rest of the paper will be dedicated to the exemplification of this argu-
ment. Indeed, since we are faced to a pragmatic argument, there would be no
watertight reasoning that could establish its validity. Hence we will attempt to
persuade the reader by means of an example. In order to give such an example,
we will use the logic of proofs, which is a logic recently introduced by Artemov
[1]. We will show that the proof that this logic enjoys an analytic Gentzen sys-
tem uncovers crucial and hidden features of the logic itself. We strongly em-
phasise that we choose the logic of proofs to exemplify our argument because,
as we hope the reader will realise, this case is enlightening for what we aim to
explain. However, many other logics could have been used for illustrating our
argument in support of the analyticity property. Otherwise stated, the logic of
proofs is not an ad hoc example, but it it just the most clarifying one.
2From now on, we are going to use “analyticity property” and “subformula property” as syn-
onymous.
4
3 The Logic of Proofs
We dedicate this section to a brief introduction to the logic of proofs. We first
explain the philosophical background of the logic of proofs, and then we pass
to the formal details.
Logic of Proofs Informally. The history of the logic of proofs goes back to
Brouwer and to his idea that (intuitionistic) truth means provability. In 1931-34
Heyting and Kolmogorov made Boruwer’s definition of intuitionistic truth ex-
plicit, though informal, by introducing the BHK-semantics (Brouwer-Heyting-
Kolmogorov semantics). BHK-semantics is widely recognised as the intended
semantics for intuitionistic logic and it stipulates that
• a proof of A ∧B consists of a proof of A and a proof of B,
• a proof of A ∨ B is given by presenting either a proof of A or a proof of
B,
• a proof of A → B is a construction which, given a proof of A, returns a
proof of B,
• absurdity ⊥ is a proposition which has no proof, a proof of ¬A is a con-
struction which, given a proof of A, would return a proof of ⊥.
Go¨del and Kolmogorov attempted to interpret the informal notion of BHK-
proof on the basis of the usual mathematical notion of proof, i.e. on the basis
of the notion of derivability in a formal system S. Their aim was partially
achieved by translating each intuitionistic formula A into the formula md(A)
of classical modal language, where md(A) stands for: box each subformula of
A. This way Go¨del proved that
IPC ` A if, and only if, S4 ` md(A)
Despite this important result, a central question remained: what is the in-
tended meaning of2? Informally, the interpretation2A ≈ A is provable seems
to be adequate. However, problems arise when 2A is treated as formal prov-
ability, i.e. 2A ≈ ProvPA(A¯), where ProvPA is the formal provability predi-
cate of Peano Arithmetic and A¯ stands for the numeral of the Go¨del’s number
of the formula A. Indeed, by the axiom 2A → A and the rule of necessitation,
the formula 2(2⊥ → ⊥) is an S4-theorem. This theorem then translates into
ProvPA(ProvPA(⊥)→ ⊥) i.e. PA ` Con(PA)
Such a conclusion clearly contradicts the famous second Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorem and is therefore unacceptable.
We are thus left to deal with two main questions about provability: (i) Is
there a modal logic for the formal predicate ProvPA? (ii) Is there an adequate
provability interpretation of the modal logic S4?
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The first question has been positively answered by the so called Go¨del- Lo¨b
logic GL that was introduced at the end of the ‘70 and that has been proved
to capture the formal provability predicate. The logic of proofs is, on the other
hand, an important step in the direction of a better understanding and a solu-
tion to the second question.
Logic of Proofs Formally. Having informally introduced the logic of proofs,
we now present it formally.
Definition 3.1. The language Llp contains: (i) the usual language of proposi-
tional boolean logic, (ii) proof variables x0, x1, x2, ..., (iii) proof constants c0, c1, c2, ...,
(iv) the functional symbols +, !, and ·, and (v) the operator symbol of the type
“term : formula.”
We will use a, b, c, ... for proof constants, and u, v, w, ... for proof variables.
Definition 3.2. Terms are defined by the rule
t := xi | ci | !t | t+ s | t · s
We call these terms proof polynomials and denote them by p, q, r, s, t, ....
Definition 3.3. Formulas are defined by the rule
A := p0 | ⊥ | A ∧B | A ∨B | A→ B | t : A
Informally, t : A ≈ t is a proof of A.
The Hilbert system LP is composed of:
A0 Axioms of classical logic formulated in the language Llp
A1 t : (A→ B)→ (s :A→ (t · s) :B)
A2 t :A→ A
A3 t :A→!t : t :A
A4 ti :A→ (t0 + t1) :A, where i = 0, 1
R1 Modus Ponens
R2 If A is one of the axioms A0 - A4, and c is a proof constant, then ` c : A
Many important results are provable in LP, amongst which we underline
the following one:
if LP ` A, then S4 ` (A)◦
if S4 ` A, then LP ` (A)ρ for some ρ
where (A)◦ is the formula obtained from A by replacing all subformulas of
the form t : B by 2B; on the other hand, (A)ρ is obtained by assigning proof
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polynomials to all subformulas 2B of A (the assignment of proof polynomials
must satisfy a few technical conditions).
This result demonstrates that the logic of proofs represent the provability
interpretation of the modal logic S4. Artemov [1] has shown that Lp is sound
and complete with respect to Peano Arithemtic, while Fitting [5] has proved
that Lp is sound and complete with respect to a Kripke semantics enriched
with an evidence function.
Amongst the several interesting developments of the logic of proofs, there
exists an intuitionistic version of LP, ILP, which has been introduced in [2].
The Hilbert system ILP is composed by the same axioms of LP except for the
base which is intuitionistic, i.e. at the item A0 we do not have the axioms of
classical logic formulated in the language Llp, but those of intuitionistic logic.
The results that are provable about LP are also provable for ILP. So for example
we can prove a theorem that states the equivalence between ILP and the modal
system S4 with an intuitionistic base.
4 Proof Analysis of the Logic of Proofs
We have thus introduced the two Hilbert systems LP and ILP. These two sys-
tems have a deep philosophical meaning and they enjoy several interesting for-
mal features. But what about their Gentzen calculi? Following [1] and [2], we
can formulate two similar sequent calculi for the two systems LP and ILP, re-
spectively. (The only difference between these two sequent calculi is the usual
difference between a sequent calculus for classical logic and a sequent calcu-
lus for intuitionistic logic: in the second case the consequent of the sequent
contains at most one formula.) Though simple and cut-free, these two sequent
calculi fail to satisfy the subformula property. Indeed in both calculi we can
find this rule:3
M ⇒ s : (A→ B), [N ] P ⇒ t : A, [Q]
M,P ⇒ (s · t) : B, [N ], [Q]
that clearly violates this requirement.
Given this situation, and also the conviction of the necessity for a logic to
have an analytic sequent calculus, it seems worth to attempt to ameliorate the
proof theory for the logic of proofs. There are basically two choices: either one
can try to improve Artemov’s calculus, or one can restart from scratch. Let us
opt for the second possibility . More precisely, let us restrict our attention on
the intuitionistic logic of proofs and let us try to find a new analytic sequent
calculus for the the system ILP. (It will be easy to verify that technique used
for LP can also be applied to the classical case LP.) The departing point is the
following reflection.
3We put the contexts N, Q in square brackets since they should be taken into account in the
classical case, while they should be ignored in the intuitionistic case.
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The main feature of the logic of proofs consists in the use of proof polyno-
mials. Where in modal logic we have formulas of the form 2A, in the logic
of proofs we have formulas of the form t : A. Therefore, if we want to find
a sequent calculus for the logic of proofs, the first step is to find logical rules
that introduce formulas of the form t : A on the left and on the right side of
the sequent. In order to understand how to formulate these logical rules, we
look at the semantic interpretation of formulas of the form t :A, and reflect this
interpretation in the Gentzen framework. (We adopt this strategy because it
often happens to be an useful one.) Following Mkrtychev [12], the semantic
interpretation of formulas of the form t :A is the following
t :A is true if, and only if, A is true and t is a proof of A
Let us attempt to express this equivalence in the sequent calculus. While it is
of course easy to express in the Gentzen framework the fact that the formulas
A and t :A are true, the fact that “t :A is a proof of A” is more difficult to be
conveyed. Our solution to this issue is to introduce the notion of typed natural
deduction sequent, for short TND-sequent.
Definition 4.1. A TND-sequent is an object of the form
s1 :B1, ..., sn :Bn ` t :A
where the formulas s1 :B1, ..., sn :Bn form a multiset.
TND-sequents can be seen as natural deduction derivations, written in se-
quent style and where the only formulas that can occur are of the form t :A. As
it will become clear below, the idea is to put side by side a standard sequent
and a multiset of TND-sequents. This way we can intuitively interpret TND-
sequents in the following way: the formula which lies on the right side of the
` expresses the fact that t is a proof of A, while the formulas that lie on the left
side of the ` are meant to represent the assumptions by means of which we can
construct the proof t of A. This will become clear once we introduce the proof
rules of the calculus Gilp.
Syntactic Notation
- M,N, ... stand for multisets of formulas,
- M,N, ... stand for multisets of formulas of the form t :A,
- M,N, ... stand for multisets of formulas that are not of the form t :A,
- T1, T2, ... stand for TND-sequents,
- Σ, Θ, ... stand for sequents, which is to say objects of the form M ⇒ N ,
- G,H, ... stand for multisets of TND-sequents.
Definition 4.2. The notion of proof sequent is defined in the following way:
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- if Σ is a sequent, then Σ is a proof sequent,
- if Σ is a sequent and G ≡ T1 | ... | Tn is a multiset of TND-sequents, then
G | Σ is a proof sequent.
Note that we use two separate notations, namely ` and⇒, to emphasise the
distinction between TND-sequents and classical sequents, respectively. Such a
distinction is purely notational and does not involve any technical issue.
Definition 4.3. The intended interpretation τ of a proof sequent is:
- (M ⇒ C)τ := (∧M → C),
- (M1 ` t1 : A1 | ... | Mn ` tn : An | M ⇒ C)τ := (
∧
M1 → t1 : A1) ∧
... (
∧
Mn → tn :An) ∧ (
∧
M → C)
Using the notion of proof sequent we can build up the sequent calculus
Gilp that has been firstly introduced in [14]. Gilp is shown in Figure 1. Let
us dwell for a moment on the rules of Gilp. The axioms are composed by the
standard axioms of intuitionistic logic, plus n TND sequents all in axiomatic
form. The propositional rules are the usual ones operating on proof sequents.
Then we have the proof rules PA and PK. The rules PA and PK reflect the
semantic interpretation of formulas of the form t :A if read top-down. Indeed
the rule PA tells us that if A is false then t : A is false. The rule PK, on the
contrary, tells us that if A is true and t is a proof of A, then t :A is true. In the
rule PK the role of TND sequents becomes clear. Roughly explained, the role
of the TND sequents is to introduce a kind of meta-proof-level in the sequent
calculus. They are derivations plugged into derivations.
As for the polynomial rules, we should observe that they only operate on
TND sequents. Basically, these rules tell us how we can use the functional sym-
bols !, · and +. The rule ci, on the other hand, tells us when we can introduce
the proof (constant) c of one of the axiomsA0−A4 of ILP. Note that the fact that
c is a proof of one of the axioms A0 − A4 does not depend on any assumption,
since the left side of the ` is empty.
The calculus Gilp is a rather satisfying sequent calculus. Indeed, as has
been proved in [14], Gilp is sound and complete with respect to the system
ILP, its structural rules are height-preserving admissible, the cut-rule is elim-
inable and its left logical rules are height-preserving invertible. Nevertheless
Gilp presents a major shortcoming, namely it does not satisfy the subformula
property. This is because of the polynomial rule:
G |M,P ` t : (A→ F ) |M,Q ` t′ :A | Σ
G |M,P,Q ` (t · t′) :F | Σ 
Thus we are faced to a rather awkward situation. There exist two sequent
calculi, built with very different means, i.e. in one case with the standard se-
quent calculus, while in the second case with a much reacher structure, namely
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Figure 1: The calculus Gilp
Axioms
t1 :A1 ` t1 :A1 | ... | tn :An ` tn :An | p,M ⇒ p
t1 :A1 ` t1 :A1 | ... | tn :An ` tn :An |M,⊥ ⇒ C
Propositional and Proof Rules
G | A,B,M ⇒ C
G | A ∧B,M ⇒ C ∧A
G |M ⇒ A G |M ⇒ B
G |M ⇒ A ∧B ∧K
G | A,M ⇒ C G | B,M ⇒ C
G | A ∨B,M ⇒ C ∨A
G |M ⇒ Ai
G |M ⇒ A0 ∨A1 ∨K
G |M ⇒ A G | B,M ⇒ C
G | A→ B,M ⇒ C →A
G | A,M ⇒ B
G |M ⇒ A→ B →K
G | t :A,A,M ⇒ C
G | t :A,M ⇒ C PA
G | N,P ` t :A | N,Q,M⇒ A
G | N,P,Q,M⇒ t :A PK
Polynomial Rules
G |M ` ti :A | Σ
G |M ` t0 + t1 :A | Σ +
G |M ` t :A | Σ
G |M `!t : t :A | Σ !
G |M,P ` t : (A→ F ) |M,Q ` t′ :A | Σ
G |M,P,Q ` (t · t′) :F | Σ 
G | Σ
G | ` c :A | Σ ci
4
proof sequents, they both are cut-free, but none of them satisfies the subfor-
mula property. In both cases the subformula property is violated because of a
rule that introduces the symbol ·. In front of this weird situation there are, as
far as we can see, two available options: either we surrender because we think
that this strange state of affairs is simply due to the fact that the logic of proofs
does not have analytic proofs, or we try to broach the problem from a different
point of view. We follow this second option, analysing the situation in a deeper
way.
5 The Coveted Analyticity
Let us start our detailed analysis of the logic of proofs by considering the fol-
lowing theorem of ILP
t :A ∧ s :B → (c · t · s) : (A ∧B)
Informally speaking this theorem says that, if we have a proof t for the formula
A, and a proof s for the formula B, then we can construct the proof (c · t · s) for
the formula A ∧ B. The proof (c · t · s) is constructed by means of the rule ci,
which introduces the formula c : (A → (B → A ∧ B)), and two applications of
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the rule .
Considering the form of the rule , we can understand the symbol · to be a
sort of cut at the polynomial level. Thus the proof (c · t · s) can be thought of
as containing two cuts. Suppose that we want to eliminate these two cuts. The
question naturally arises: if we eliminate these two cuts, what do we substitute
them with? In other words, what kind of alternative proof can we formulate for
the formulaA∧B? As far as we can see, there is only one answer: our language
is too poor to formulate any proof polynomial labelling the formulaA∧B, that
does not contain the symbol ·. Indeed, the only symbols that we have are ! and
+, which are evidently inadequate for this purpose. So we are faced with the
following problem: the logic of proofs does not have the means to eliminate
the cuts at the polynomial level. In order to modify this situation and reach the
desired analyticity, the only possible strategy is to change the language of the
logic of proofs. More precisely, we want to enhance the language of the logic
of proofs by means of the the functional symbols of the λ-calculus for the logic
of proofs (see [2]).
In order to explain why we want to use the functional symbols of the λ-
calculus (for the logic of proofs), let us focus on the constants of the logic of
proofs. We can think of each constant introduced by the rule ci as being labelled
by one and only one axiom (see for further details [1, p.9]). The constant c of
the example above is labelled by the axiom A→ (B → A ∧B). In the typed λ-
calculus, thanks to the normalisation theorem, we know that each intuitionistic
axiom types a different closed λ-term in normal form. Following up with our
example, the axiomA→ (B → A∧B) types the λ-term λx.λy.p(x, y). Therefore
we seem to have the following relations:
constants→ intuitionistic axioms→ closed λ-terms in normal form
Suppose that we replace constants by λ-terms in normal forms. Then the
formula
t :A ∧ s :B → (c · t · s) : (A ∧B)
becomes the formula
t :A ∧ s :B → ((λx.λy.p(x, y)) · t · s) : (A ∧B)
It is easy to see that the λ-term ((λx.λy.p(x, y)) · t · s) is no longer in nor-
mal form, on the contrary it contains two redexes. Therefore, thanks to the
λ-calculus, our intuition that the proof (c · t · s) can be thought of as containing
two cuts, is now clearer: if rewritten in λ-style, i.e. as ((λx.λy.p(x, y)) · t · s),
the proof contains two redexes. If in the constants’ case, there was no way to
eliminate cuts, as we have explained above, now, with the introduction of λ-
terms, this can be done. Indeed the λ-term ((λx.λy.p(x, y)) · t · s) reduces to
p(s, t) : (A ∧B) and therefore we have
t :A ∧ s :B → p(s, t) : (A ∧B)
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Given a proof t of A and a proof s of B, we have a cut-free (or redex-free) proof
p(s, t) of A ∧B.
In [15] these intuitions have been deeply exploited. First of all we have con-
sidered a language L∗lp obtained from the language Llp by dropping constants
and adding the functional symbols of the λ-calculus for the logic of proofs (see
[2]).
Definition 5.1. The language L∗lp contains: (i) the usual language of proposi-
tional boolean logic, (ii) proof variables x0, x1, x2, ..., (iii) the functional sym-
bols +, !, p, pi, ki, E∨x,y , E⊥A, λu, ·, P, U, B, Si (iv) the operator symbol of the type
“term : formula.”
Let us focus on the crucial point (iii) of Definition 5.1. On the one hand, the
reader may easily recognise the functional symbols of the typed λ-calculus: p,
pi, ki, E∨x,y , E⊥A, λu (e.g. see [16]). On the other hand, we underline that the
four functional symbols P, U, B, Si were introduced by Artemov [2] for the
λ-calculus for the logic of proofs; they are meant to be used for constructing
proofs for the axioms A1 −A4.
Terms, which we call as before proof polynomials, are built from the proof-
variables by the functional symbols. The arities of the functional symbols is
made clear in the lambda and polynomial lambda rules, see Figure 2. u, v, w, ...
will denote proof variables, while p, q, r, s, t, ... will denote proof polynomials.
Formulas are defined as in Definition 3.3.
Thanks to this enriched language L∗lp, we have constructed the sequent cal-
culus Gilp∗. The sequent calculus Gilp∗ is composed by the same rules of the
sequent calculus Gilp except for the fact that the rule ci is replaced by a bunch
of rules that we have called lambda and polynomial lambda rules, see Figure
2. Let us dwell for a moment on these new rules. Consider the lambda rules.
If we concentrate on the TND sequents which these rules operate on, we can
easily see that the lambda rules are nothing but the rules of the λ-calculus. As
for the polynomial lambda rules, these are just the rules introduced in [2] for
the λ-calculus for the logic of proofs, operating in a proof sequents context.
In order to better illustrate what has changed passing from the calculus
Gilp to the calculus Gilp∗, let us return to our previous example. We have said
that t :A ∧ s :B → (c · t · s) : (A ∧ B) is a theorem of the logic of proofs. Indeed
this theorem is provable in Gilp, as the following derivation d shows:
t :A ` t :A | t :A,A,⇒ A s :B ` s :B | s :B,B ⇒ B
s :B ` s :B | t :A ` t :A | t :A,A, s :B,B ⇒ A ∧B ∧K
s :B ` s :B | t :A ` t :A | t :A, s :B ⇒ A ∧B PA∗
` c : (A→ (B → (A ∧B))) | s :B ` s :B | t :A ` t :A | t :A, s :B ⇒ A ∧B ci
s :B ` s :B | t :A ` (c · t) : (B → (A ∧B)) | t :A, s :B ⇒ A ∧B 
t :A, s :B ` (c · t · s) : (A ∧B) | t :A, s :B ⇒ A ∧B 
t :A, s :B ⇒ (c · t · s) : (A ∧B) PK
t :A ∧ s :B ⇒ (c · t · s) : (A ∧B) ∧A
⇒ t :A ∧ s :B → (c · t · s) : (A ∧B) →
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Figure 2: In the calculus Gilp∗
Lambda Rules
G |M,P ` t0 :A0 |M,Q ` t1 :A1 | Σ
G |M,P,Q ` p(t0, t1) : (A0 ∧A1)|Σ ∧I
G |M ` t :Ai | Σ
G |M ` ki(t) : (A0 ∨A1) | Σ ∨I
G |M, x :A ` t(x) :F | Σ
G |M ` λx.t(x) : (A→ F ) | Σ λ
G |M ` t :A0 ∧A1 | Σ
G |M ` pi(t) :Ai | Σ ∧E
G |M ` t :⊥ | Σ
G |M ` E⊥A(t) : A | Σ ⊥E
G |M,P,R ` t : (A0 ∨A1) |M,Q,R′, x :A0 ` q :E | P,Q,R′′, y :A1 ` q′ :E | Σ
G |M,P,Q,R,R′,R′′,` E∨x,y(t, q, q′) :E | Σ ∨E
Polynomial Lambda Rules
G |M ` r : t :A | Σ
G |M ` U(r) :A | Σ tE
G |M ` r : t :A | Σ
G |M ` B(r) :!t : t :A | Σ !I
G |M ` r : ti :A | Σ
G |M ` Si(r) : (t0 + t1) :A | Σ +I
G |M,P ` r : t : (A→ F ) |M,Q ` r′ : t′ :A | Σ
G |M,P,Q ` P(r, r′) : (t · t′) :F | Σ I
where PA∗ stands for a double application of the rule PA.
In Gilp∗ we no longer have the constants, nor the rule ci that allows us to
construct the proof polynomial c · t · s. Therefore we cannot prove the theorem
t : A ∧ s : B → (c · t · s) : (A ∧ B). On the other hand we have the means
to construct the proof polynomial λx.λy.p(x, y) which, as we have explained
above, corresponds to the constant c. So in Gilp∗ we will prove the theorem
t : A ∧ s : B → ((λx.λy.p(x, y)) · t · s) : (A ∧ B) which represents the lambda-
counterpart of the theorem t : A ∧ s : B → (c · t · s) : (A ∧ B). Let us see the
Gilp?-derivation d′ of t :A ∧ s :B → ((λx.λy.p(x, y)) · t · s) : (A ∧B), we have:
t :A ` t : A | x : A ` x : A | t :A,A⇒ A s :B ` s : B | y : B ` y :B | s :B,B ⇒ B
t :A ` t : A | s :B ` s : B | x : A ` x : A | y : B ` y :B | t :A,A, s :B,B ⇒ A ∧B ∧K
t :A ` t : A | s :B ` s : B | x : A ` x : A | y : B ` y :B | t :A, s :B ⇒ A ∧B PA∗
t :A ` t : A | s :B ` s : B | x : A, y : B ` p(x, y) : (A ∧B) | t :A, s :B ⇒ A ∧B ∧I
t :A ` t : A | s :B ` s : B | x : A ` λy.p(x, y) : (B → (A ∧B)) | t :A, s :B ⇒ A ∧B λ
t :A ` t : A | s :B ` s : B | ` λx.λy.p(x, y) : (A→ (B → (A ∧B))) | t :A, s :B ⇒ A ∧B λ
s :B ` s : B | t :A ` ((λx.λy.p(x, y)) · t) : (B → (A ∧B)) | t :A, s :B ⇒ A ∧B 
t :A, s :B ` ((λx.λy.p(x, y)) · t · s) : (A ∧B) | t :A, s :B ⇒ A ∧B 
t :A, s :B ⇒ ((λx.λy.p(x, y)) · t · s) : (A ∧B) PK
t :A ∧ s :B ⇒ ((λx.λy.p(x, y)) · t · s) : (A ∧B) ∧A
⇒ t :A ∧ s :B → ((λx.λy.p(x, y)) · t · s) : (A ∧B) →
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Figure 3: Links between Gilp and Gilp∗
Gilp∗ Gilp
So now we have two different theorems, t :A∧ s :B → (c · t · s) : (A∧B) and
t :A ∧ s :B → ((λx.λy.p(x, y)) · t · s) : (A ∧B), and the two different derivations
d and d′ of Gilp and Gilp∗, respectively. It is easy to check that none of these
derivations satisfy the subformula property. Indeed in both of them there are
formulas that are not subformulas of the formula of the conclusion. While
in the case of Gilp this situation cannot be remedied, in Gilp∗ the derivation
d′ can be changed into a derivation that satisfies the subformula property. It
suffices to operate in the following way
t :A ` t :A | t :A,A⇒ A s :B ` s :B | s :B,B ⇒ B
t :A ` t :A | s :B ` s :B | t :A,A, s :B,B ⇒ A ∧B ∧K
t :A ` t :A | s :B ` s :B | t :A, s :B ⇒ A ∧B PA∗
t :A, s :B ` p(t, s) : (A ∧B) | t :A, s :B ⇒ A ∧B ∧I
t :A, s :B ⇒ p(t, s) : (A ∧B) PK
t :A ∧ s :B ⇒ p(t, s) : (A ∧B) ∧A
⇒ t :A ∧ s :B → p(t, s) : (A ∧B) →
In [15] it has been shown that the calculus Gilp∗ is analytic. In order to
obtain this result we have operated on two levels: the sequents’ level, and
the TND sequents’ level. As for the sequents’ level, we have shown that the
cut-rule is eliminable, while at the TND sequents’ level we have proved the
normalisation theorem. The last part of our research has been dedicated to the
study of the precise relationships between Gilp and Gilp∗. We have shown
that Gilp can be embedded in a fragment of Gilp∗, and that this fragment of
Gilp∗ is on the other hand embeddable in Gilp (see Figure 3). So Gilp∗ can
be thought of as a conservative extension of the intuitionistic logic of proofs
where the analyticity of the logic of proofs can be finally reached.
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6 Conclusions
Our starting point was the search for a criterion for distinguishing good logics.
The most reasonable criterion that we have found is the existence of a good
proof system. But then, one might ask the question of what a good proof sys-
tem is. Amongst the properties discussed for defining good proof systems,
that which has received by far the most attention is the analyticity property.
Although this property has been supported throughout the history and philos-
ophy of mathematics, and Gentzen himself formalised it trough the framework
of the sequent calculus, there still exist philosophers and logiciens who under-
estimate its importance. In this paper we aimed at giving one further reason
in favour of the analyticity property, and in particular for wanting a Gentzen
calculus to satisfy the subformula property. The reason that we have proposed
is a very simple but relevant: the proof that a sequent calculus satisfies the sub-
formula property helps discovering and clarifying several aspects of the logic
that the sequent calculus has been developed for.
In order to illustrate our point, we have used the example of the logic of
proofs. The logic of proofs is a recent logic introduced by Artemov in order
to recover the explicit provability of modal and intuitionistic logic. The main
characteristic of the logic of proofs are the formulas of the form t : A, where t
is a proof polynomial, meaning “t is a proof of A.” Proof polynomials are con-
structed by means of functional symbols applied on variables and constants.
The constants are only introduced in relation with axioms, i.e. in formulas of
the form c : A where A is one of the axioms of the logic of proofs.
The logic of proofs therefore happens to be an elegant and simple logic.
However the situation slightly changes once we try to prove that there exists
a Gentzen calculus enjoying the subformula property for the logic of proofs.
Indeed in this case we discover what “is hidden” behind the language of the
logic of proofs, namely the entire functional apparatus of the typed lambda
calculus. In the paper [1] Artemov already hints a correspondence between the
constants of the logic of proofs and the lambda terms in normal form typed by
the corresponding axioms; nevertheless, it is thanks to the analysis of [15] that
this correspondence is brought to light and explicitely stated. This is certainly
no slim discovery. But what matters for us here is that this discovery has been
brought to light by the search of an analytic calculus. Thus analyticity is impor-
tant not only for the sake of dealing with analytic proofs, but also for the deep
revelations that it allows to make. The logic of proofs is but a paradigmatic
example of this fact.
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